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Major Incident Communication Cascade Evaluation 
Abstract 
The development of an “all hazard” major incident response plan has unique 
challenges in a developing world setting. The judicious use of limited resources 
requires careful application during especially planning and training 
preparations. The initial development and training drills of a cascade system can 
be the effective bridge between preparation and response. 
This study described the initial development of a communication cascade system 
at two private hospitals in the Cape Town metropolitan area. Comparisons 
between activation drills at different times of the day and each other highlighted 
the operational deficiencies experienced. Most (more than 80%) off the staff 
activated were in hospital within an estimated 30 minutes from activation during 
the day or night. The most significant delay was experienced during night 
activation with the estimated response time increased by more than 57%, staff 
activation time was 76% slower and on average 10 % less staff were contactable 
and available at night. Transport requirements for off site staff increased from 
32.1% during the day to 37.7% with a nighttime activation. 
The key development elements identified for a cascade template were: attention 
to the structure (critical roles activated first, specific standby and declared 
structures), up to date contact lists made freely available, back up 
communication equipment development and regular training drills at different 
times. 
This study was limited due to the inherent lack of structured communication 
cascade systems in hospitals in both private and state hospitals in Cape Town. A 
lasting legacy of major incident planning preparation can only be achieved by 
enforcing the legislative Disaster Risk Management requirements. 
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Chapter 1: Background 
 
The world population is estimated to be 6.69 billion (20 November 2009) (World 
Bank, World Development Indicators 2009) and is predicted to reach 9 billion by 
2050. The World Bank also estimates that 8 billion of the population in 2050 will 
be located in the developing world. The hazards of climate change, the massive 
population growth, worsening of poverty and conflict increases the risk of 
disasters (Schipper et al 2006). 
Over the last 25 years natural disasters have claimed an estimated 3.5 million 
lives with enormous socio-economic consequences (Tintanelli et al 
2004)(Thomalla et al 2006)(Schipper et al 2006). The indirect effects (food 
shortages, disease, civil unrest, etc) on the surviving vulnerable population 
compound the suffering. 
Examples of recent disasters include the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 (250 000 
estimated casualties) (Carley et al 2005), hurricane Katrina 2005 in the United 
States, cyclone Nagris in Myanmar 2008 (estimated 100 000 casualties) (Dara et 
al 2009) and the devastating 2010 earthquake in Haiti (estimated 200 000+ 
casualties). The worst natural disaster in recorded history was due to flooding 
caused by the Yellow River in China (1887), an estimated 900 000 people were 
killed. One million more lives were lost due to disease and food shortages that 
followed (Hodgetts et al 2002).  
The effects of global warming over the next few decades are predicted to 
adversely affect weather conditions (Thompkins et al 2008)(Thomalla et al 2006). 
This will cause an increase in flooding especially in the more densely populated 
coastal and low laying areas (Costanza et al 2007). 
In recent years the world has also seen an increase in unnatural or manmade 
disasters. These include acts of terrorism like the World Trade Centre 2001 New 
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York (2726 killed), Tokyo sarin gas attack 1995 (11 died and 5500 injured) and 
the Oklahoma City bombing 1995 (163 died)(Dara et al 2009). There is an 
ongoing threat of political instability in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Africa and 
South East Asia. Major transport incidents like airplane accidents receive the 
most media coverage but are quite uncommon. Rail, road and sea transport 
incidents are more common (Hodgetts et al 2002). Other risks may lead to even 
greater loss of life, like the chemical disaster in Bhopal India 1984 (10 000 died) 
(Dara et al 2009) or industrial accidents like Chernobyl in Russia, a nuclear 
reactor overheated in 1986 (56 died immediately). Mass gathering incidents 
commonly involve sport stadia due to overfilling, crowd surges or structural 
collapse (Hodgetts et al 2002). 
The emergency physician and emergency medicine worldwide are increasingly 
positioned in a central role in the planning, risk assessment and medical 
response to disasters (Dara et al 2009). The American College of Emergency 
Physicians (ACEP) has since 1976 (Tintanelli et al 2004) incorporated this in their 
training. Disaster planning is now part of the curriculum for their’ and the 
Canadian (Alexander et al 2005) emergency physician residency programs.  
Disaster medicine can possibly trace its origins to the plague pandemic in 
Europe during the Middle Ages (Dara et al 2005). In response to the “Black 
Death” health structures were established to monitor the disease and collect 
information. It has evolved into sophisticated systems like the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) of the United States or the international Major 
Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS) systems. 
Disaster medicine is taught as a subject at pre- and postgraduate level at most 
European universities (De Boer 1995). The European Master in Disaster 
Medicine is a one-year course offered at postgraduate level. It was launched in 
1998 with the one founding university from Italy and one from Belgium. Six 
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institutions from both Europe and the United States of America support this 
course.  
The Major Incident Medical Management and Support- The practical approach 
at the scene (MIMMS) and the Major Incident Medical Management and 
Support- The practical approach in the hospital (HMIMMS) courses have 
become one of the international standards in the medical preparation and 
response to disasters. They are not part of formal training (Chapman et al 2008) 
but are widely taught in the United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, Asia, 
Australia, Northern Africa and more recently in South Africa.  
These training courses focus firstly on education then on exercises. It is these 
exercises especially between different governmental agencies where the 
operational flaws of disaster plans are identified (Hodgetts et al 2002). The 
operational lessons can then be incorporated in new, validated and revised 
disaster plans (Brady 2003). A real time exercise should be the effective bridge 
between training and responding to a disaster (Ingrassia et al 2009). These 
exercises are costly and involve complex organizational planning. A strong 
political will is essential to drive the preparation program (Marx et al 
2002)(Burstein 2008). Further pre-hospital courses include the Pre-hospital 
Trauma Life Support (PHTLS), Pre-hospital Emergency Care (PHEC) and the 
Pre-hospital Paediatric Life Support (PHPLS)(Carley et al 2005). From an in 
hospital perspective other major incident preparation courses include the Safe 
Transfer and Retrieval (STaR) and the Paediatric and Neonatal Safe Transfer 
and Retrieval (PNEO-STaR)(Carley et al 2005).   
The most significant advances in disaster preparation seem to occur only after 
disasters. The events of September 11 in 2001 was the catalyst for a major United 
States governmental policy shift to focus on disaster preparation and 
management (Tintanelli et al 2004)(Dara et al 2009)(Manley et al 2006). Similarly 
in South Africa the floods of June 1994 on the Cape Flats led to the formation of 
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an Inter-ministerial Committee for Disaster Management and culminated in the 
2002 Disaster Management Act (Wallis et al 2007). 
This 2002 Act regulates the responsibilities of disaster management on a 
national, provincial and municipal level in South Africa. It focuses on disaster 
risk reduction, mitigation of a disaster’s impact and the emergency preparation, 
response and recovery phases during a disaster (Wallis et al 2007). 
The challenge for the developing world is effective disaster preparation with 
limited resources. Relying on international aid during a major incident is 
ineffective in mitigating the wider socio-economic impact or in prevention of 
future risks. The World Health Organization developed the Essential Trauma 
Care Program to help establish affordable preparation structures for disasters 
(Goosen et al 2005). 
The biggest challenge facing the developed world is one of shifting from almost 
unlimited resources for each single patient to a situation of limited resources to 
do “the most for the most”. Preparation needs planning, training and specific 
exercises to develop the skills needed to manage a disaster (Baker 2007). These 
plans should incorporate the shift from “standard of care” to “sufficiency of 
care” (Dara et al 2009).  
International policy to reduce and mitigate the socio-economic impact of 
disasters has taken four distinct directions: reducing disaster risk, environment 
management, climate change adaptation and efforts at alleviating poverty 
(Thomalla et al 2006)(Schipper et al 2006). These are complex and possibly 
divergent directions. The challenge in future will be to coordinate these efforts 
globally. 
The challenge South Africa currently faces in preparation for the 2010 Soccer 
World Cup is enormous. The first step in this planning process may require 
Un
ve
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 5 
research to review the present status of hospital preparedness in dealing with 
major incidents, thereafter developing local and national strategies.  
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Chapter 2: Introduction 
 
An understanding of the structure of the major incident response is essential in 
the development of a major incident plan. The Advanced Life Support Group 
(ALSG) with the MIMMS and HMIMMS courses established an international 
structured approach to pre-hospital and hospital major incident response. This 
system is the preferred structure utilized in South Africa’s incident preparation 
of the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup. The biggest preparation challenge is 
incorporating this system into the national, provincial and local structures. 
Utilizing one system ensures effective communication with all responders using 
a common language, terminology and structure (Marx et al 2002). 
The development of these new South African response structures requires these 
definitions and classifications to be incorporated with local adaptations. The 
opportunity exists whereby the MIMMS system remains the basic structure with 
the added local and international modifications and improvements.   
This system is comparable in terms of definitions and classification to other 
international disaster systems. 
 
1. Definitions 
Disaster management and data collection requires clear definitions and 
classification of disasters. Unfortunately there seems to be no universal 
definition of a disaster (Below et al 2009). This limits the effective collection and 
comparison of global disaster data.  
Internationally the different definitions range from describing a disaster as an 
event that overwhelms response capabilities (Marx et al 2002) or overwhelms 
local capacity, requiring external assistance (Below et al 2009). A more 
mathematical approach formulates it as a destructive event that claims so many 
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casualties that a discrepancy arises between the numbers involved and their 
treatment capacity of the responding services (De Boer et al 2000). 
From a hospital perspective a disaster can be where the patient surge at a point 
in time, prevent even minimal emergency care without added external resources 
(Tintanelli et al 2004). 
In general terms disaster medicine can be defined as the study of the health care 
approach to the medical impact in the prevention, preparation, response and 
recovery phases of a disaster (Wallis et al 2007). 
In an attempt to better clarify and standardize disaster definitions the term 
“major incident” has been proposed (Carley et al 2005). This may help 
standardizing the classification internationally and better assist future planning 
and incident research.   
For the purposes of this study a major incident is defined according to the 
MIMMS and HMIMMS definitions. A major incident is then defined as an 
incident where the location, number, severity or type of casualties requires 
extraordinary resources (Hodgetts et al 2002) or more succinctly where an 
extraordinary response is required by the emergency services (Carley et al 2005). 
A cascade may be defined as a succession of processes or actions that develop in 
incremental stages towards a cumulative effect (Mosby et al 2009). A 
communication cascade, in terms of this study, is defined as a series of 
successive steps ensuring rapid notification of key health personnel required in 
responding to a major incident.   
 
2. Classification of major incidents 
The South African Disaster Management Act, Number 57 of 2002 (Government 
Gazette 2003), classifies a disaster into local, provincial or national according to 
the impact on the governmental structures. It stipulates that a local disaster is 
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contained to only one district, provincial when more than one district is affected 
in the same province and national if more than one province is affected. 
The MIMMS course classifies a major incident according to the type, location, 
number of casualties, effect on the emergency services and the affected 
population (De Boer et al 2000)(Hodgetts et al 2002). These classifications are 
primarily used in the research and data collection in major incident planning. 
This adds a more scientific or mathematical approach to disaster medicine (De 
Boer 1999). From a practical and communication point of view, responders will 
consist of multiple agencies and need to use a common language and 
terminology (Marx et al 2002). It is important to note the limitation of each 
classification. 
 
2.1 Type of major incident 
The incident can be classified into natural on the one hand and manmade, 
unnatural or technological on the other. The limitation of this is that most 
“natural” disasters are complex and are due to human factors. An example is 
overcrowding in coastal and low laying areas in a flood contribute directly to 
the loss of live.  
Manmade/ unnatural or technological include transport incidents, industrial 
incidents, mass gathering events (crowds of 1000 and more) and civil disorder 
incidents (including terrorism) (Carley et al 2005). 
In a framework policy on Disaster Risk Management it was proposed that South 
Africa utilize the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) hazard 
classification (National Disaster Management Centre 2010). This classifies 
hazards into natural (geological, biological and hydrometeorological), 
technological and environmental hazards.  
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This ISDR classification is based on the international EM-DAT database used by 
the Centre on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Combining two of the largest 
international natural disaster databases (EM-DAT and NatCatService), a more 
complete classification was proposed. This may in future create an even more 
standardized classification for research of natural disasters globally (Below et al 
2009). 
 
2.2 Effect on the community 
This classification focuses on the effect on the hospital, road or communication 
networks. A simple incident is where the infrastructure stay intact and a 
compound incident is where the infrastructure is destroyed (Carley et al 2005). 
 
2.3 Effect on the health services 
The major incident will affect the health services’ ability to respond (Hodgetts et 
al 2002). The extent of the effect will determine if it may be considered 
compensated, where the extra health resources mobilized to cope with the 
extraordinary circumstances are adequate to respond. An uncompensated 
incident therefore will be when these extra resources are inadequate to cope 
with the massive workload required. 
According to this classification a disaster can be classified as a compound and 
uncompensated major incident. 
 
2.4 Location 
From the hospital perspective the incident will be either internal if the incident 
occurred within the hospital grounds or external if it occurred in the 
surrounding area or community (Marx et al 2002).  
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The limitation of this classification is where the hospital is part of the incident 
for example in a flood or earthquake. 
 
2.5 Size 
The exact number of casualties does not necessarily determine if a major 
incident occurred. For instance ten patients from one incident can cripple a 
small community health centre. A large trauma unit might be able to handle up 
to twenty patients from one incident without requiring external support. The 
capability and surge capacity of each hospital will determine the exact number 
that determines if a major incident has occurred. Quantifying these numbers for 
each hospital is crucial in the planning stage of a major incident plan.  
De Boer et al in 2000 proposed a classification into minor, moderate or severe 
according to purely the number of casualties. They considered the total number 
of casualties (alive or dead) and the number presenting to hospital. The largest 
limitation with this classification is that it does not take into account local surge 
capacity neither the local capabilities. 
 
3.  Incident Response Structure development 
The response structure to a major incident may be divided into pre-hospital and 
hospital phases. It is imperative that emergency physicians be well versed with 
the plans in both pre-hospital and hospital incidents (Doyle 1990). The 
integration of these plans will ensure a coordinated response (O’Neill 2005). 
This coordination is especially important in a hospital’s incident response 
activation. This may also enable efficient and smoother transition from 
treatment in the field to definitive care in hospital.  
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3.1 Pre-hospital phases 
The MIMMS system divides the pre-hospital phase into preparation, response 
and recovery phases (Hodgetts et al 2002).  
 
3.1.1 Pre-hospital: Preparation phase 
In terms of medical preparation it is during the planning stages that mitigation 
of the disastrous effect of a major incident is effected. Each sphere of the 
response needs an organizational incident response plan. This ranges through 
all governmental levels, emergency medical services (EMS), non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s), military and both state and private receiving hospitals. 
It is the integration between these structures that are complex and challenging.  
The most important part of preparation is adequate training (Baker 2007). All 
responders need to be familiar with the major incident plan and be able to 
utilize the equipment properly. The training drills can range from tabletop 
exercises (testing communication and incident structures) (Shover 2007) (Marx 
et al 2002) to a community and multiagency exercise with volunteer victims 
(Keeny 2004). Exercising the components of the plan (like exercising radio 
procedures and specific triage exercises) regularly would ensure that the live 
exercises run more effectively (Hodgetts et al 2002)(Tintanelli et al 2004). 
Specific evidence to support major incident training to improve skills and 
knowledge is still lacking at this stage (Williams et al 2008)(Kaji 2007). A 
systematic review on the effectiveness of training from Williams et al in 2008, 
showed mixed results, but computer and lecture training may be effective 
training for pre-hospital providers. The review pointed to numerous study 
limitations and inadequacies that prevented firm conclusions to be made from 
them.  
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3.1.2 Pre-hospital: Response phase 
The response at the scene should have an “all hazard” (Hodgets et al 2002)(Born 
et al 2007)(Carley et al 2005) and structured approach. The United States (US) 
adopted an Incident Command System (ICS) structure. It was developed in the 
1970’s by the Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential 
Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) taskforce to respond to wildfires (Skivington et al 
2006). This management system standardized the organization of a response in 
the US into an incident command, operations, planning, logistics and finance 
sections (Marx et al 2002)(Tintanelli et al 2004). Internationally a similar 
structure is used with the MIMMS system. Both these systems provide a flexible 
structure for pre-hospital response; these can either expand or contract as 
required at the scene. 
Major Incident Medical Management and Support pre-hospital system has a 
seven-tiered structure consisting of a command, safety, communication, 
assessment, triage, treatment and transport sections (CSCATTT)(Hodgets et al 
2002).  
The first priority of command, infers a vertical structure with the emphasis on a 
“collapsible hierarchy” (Hodgetts et al 2002) concept. This structure provides 
the ability for a small number of responders occupying many roles initially and 
expanding or contracting as the incident develops. Role assignment ensures no 
single individual’s absence causes disruption of the organizational structure.  
It is imperative that each responder be familiar with the chain of command to 
effectively utilize resources and healthcare providers at the scene (Shover 2007).  
The most common failing in major incident management is poor communication 
(Hodgetts et al 2002)(Tintanelli et al 2004)(Martchenke et al 1994)(Milsten 
2000)(Roccaforte 2001). This includes failures between multiple agencies 
(Martchenke et al 1995), in hospital and equipment failures. Alternative and 
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back up modalities need to be incorporated into the plan. Specific 
communication training and daily equipment checks should be routine.  
A rapid assessment at the scene determines the requirements there and at the 
receiving hospitals. Frequently the initial information will be inaccurate but 
with adequate communication this will improve as the incident progresses 
(Hodgetts et al 2002). It is the lack of information flow to the hospitals that 
prevented adequate preparation during the Loma Prieta earthquake in the San 
Francisco Bay area in 1989 (Martchenke et al 1995). 
 
3.1.3 Pre-hospital: Recovery phase 
In the aftermath of a major incident the recovery phase will include both the 
structural repair of infrastructure and rehabilitation of the affected population 
(Wallis et al 2007). This includes the survivors as well as the emergency 
responders.  
 
3.2 Hospital phases 
The United States utilizes the Incident Command System (ICS) and specifically 
the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) as the preferred 
organizational response tool to major incidents in hospital (Tintanelli et al 
2004)(O’Neill 2005)(Born et al 2007). 
The Major Incident Medical Management and Support: The Practical Approach 
in the Hospital proposes another international system of incident response from 
a hospital perspective. This incorporates the same CSCATTT structure as the 
MIMMS model (Carley et al 2005). It is divided into pre-hospital, reception, 
definitive care and recovery phases (Carley et al 2005).  
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3.2.1 Hospital: Pre-hospital phase 
South Africa has, like most developing countries, severe hospital staff shortages. 
This limits the medical response at the scene to mostly EMS medical responders. 
Ideally hospital personnel should be deployed in hospital and not at the scene 
unless organized in specific pre-hospital response teams (Carley et al 2005). 
These are specialized roles that need training and regular updates to seamlessly 
integrate into the pre-hospital incident structures.  
Medical personnel should be familiar and be involved in regional preparation 
plan development (Marx et al 2004). Specifically the emergency physicians need 
the knowledge of both the pre-hospital and hospital plans to ensure the 
seamless response from the scene to hospital care (Doyle 1990). Local hospitals 
need to be aware of all regional hospital capabilities. Agreements on mutual aid 
during a major incident have to be in place as part of the plan. 
 
3.2.2 Hospital: Reception phase 
The reception phase starts when the first casualties arrive at the hospital. This is 
the busiest time, with patients’ arrival by any transport means. It is crucial that 
the major incident plan be seamlessly and effectively activated to handle this 
chaotic stage. At this stage personnel should ideally be activated quickly and 
efficiently using a structured activation system. The HMIMMS course proposes 
a communication cascade activation system (Carley et al 2005).  
The primary objective during reception is preparation of clinical priority areas 
like the emergency room, theater and intensive care unit. Secondary objectives 
are support services consisting of clinical, non-clinical and management services 
(Carley et al 2005). 
The application of the HMIMMS system in South African hospitals will require 
specific local adaptations. Some (both state and private) emergency units in the 
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Cape Town metropolitan area utilize a pre-prepared major incident filing 
system. The implementation of this system nationally may possibly be an 
important step in standardizing national incident preparation. 
Pre-prepared notes with a unique identifying number will ensure each patient is 
logged and movements accurately tracked. Documentation at every step is 
essential but should not cause delays. The allocation of numbers for unidentified 
patients should preferably only be allocated in one area and tied to the patient 
(Lavery et al 2005).  
In a South African context it is especially the porter and security services that 
present a challenge. The lack of training and high staff turnover may severely 
limit the ability to control an incident response. The porter service is central to 
all patient and equipment movement.  
The security service and possibly with the help of the porter service should be 
directing patient and vehicle flow from very early on. Command and control 
will be lost if the security service is not able to control the traffic routes on site 
and in hospital. The training to execute these unfamiliar tasks is especially 
important where some hospitals in Cape Town use sub-contractors to provide 
security services. 
 
3.2.3 Hospital: Definitive Care phase 
This phase starts once the patients have moved from the receiving areas. This 
definitive treatment entails both surgical and non-surgical responses. 
A structured surgical team response is required to lead the response during 
both the reception and definitive phases (Carley et al 2005). In South Africa the 
private health system relies on specialist that cover more than one hospital on 
any given on call day. The true surgical cover will be limited in a major incident 
to one specialist for possibly two or three hospitals.  
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The initial focus during a major incident should only be life saving or critical 
surgeries. Resources may allow more time later in the response but services 
should be restricted to only the minimum that is safe (Carley et al 2005). This 
ensures “the most for the most”. 
Similarly a structured physician team response is needed for the non-surgical or 
medical response (Carley et al 2005). The same limitation for private hospital 
physician cover exists than for the surgical service. This limitation in the true 
specialist cover will require the development of a specific backup call roster for 
off duty specialist.  
In most hospitals intensive care beds are limited and only a small number of 
extra beds can be utilized. It was previously noted in the United Kingdom that 
most Intensive Care Units are usually 90% full on normal occupancy rates 
(Morrow et al 1996). This limitation is very similar or possibly worse in a South 
African context. Critical care will still be restricted and patients should be 
identified for possible transfer (Carley et al 2005).   
 
3.2.4 Hospital: Recovery phase 
HMIMMS divide this phase into resolution, reflection and audit parts (Carley et 
al 2005). 
It is during the resolution phase where a specific business continuation plan will 
need to be activated. Rescheduling elective surgery cases according to priority 
will ensure an ordered resumption of clinical duties. Previous major incidents 
have shown the surgical services were still overloaded from five (Lavery et al 
2005) to seven days (Stevens et al 1990) after the incident.  
The reflection phase will entail debriefing, both operational and emotional 
(Carley et al 2005). The operational debrief should highlight all the positive 
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aspects of the response and areas of improvement in the execution of the current 
major incident plan. 
A formal audit of the major incident will strengthen future plans. It is preferable 
that the audit be presented to those involved in the incident. The emphasis must 
remain on improving the service and it should not blame individuals (Carley et 
al 2005). It would be beneficial at this stage in liaising with other agencies like 
EMS, police and traffic on improving inter-agency cooperation. 
  
4. Communication Cascade (Call Down) System 
An integral part of a major incident plan is the communication cascade system, 
which is a structured approach utilized to mobilize key personnel. 
4.1 Major Incident declaration  
The major incident plan should include preparation for both an internal or 
external major incident. An internal major incident may be defined as any event 
that disrupts a hospital’s ability to perform its regular services (Marx et al 2002). 
It can range from a fire, bomb threat, severe water damage, overcrowding, 
failure of services or equipment. This preparation should include clear 
definitions of when an internal plan may be activated, who may activate the 
plan and which personnel are activated first. This should also include clear 
plans for each type of incident and define a specific evacuation plan.  
An external major incident, as previously noted, may be defined as any incident 
that occurred outside the hospital premises. The hospital’s major incident plan 
must also define both the personnel able to activate the plan as well as the 
criteria when to declare an external major incident (Tintanelli et al 2004).  
A major incident can be declared after receiving information from the 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) or by the hospital themselves (Carley et al 
2005).  
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The HMIMMS proposes two levels of activation and one cancelling the 
activation (Carley et al 2005). The first level is “Major incident – Standby”. This 
is a limited or partial activation of only specific personnel in preparation of a 
possible incident. It would entail activation of senior staff only that will assess 
the current status of the hospital. 
 The next level of activation after receiving confirmation is “Major Incident – 
Declared”. This is the complete or full activation of the plan from staff 
notification, the preparation of receiving areas to the establishment of the major 
incident command structure (Carley et al 2005).  
“Major Incident – Canceled” will cancel any previous activation, either Standby 
or at the end of full activation. This will notify all personnel previously activated 
to stand down (Carley et al 2005). The activation plan needs to be robust enough 
to be activated at any time and to notify additional personnel quickly. 
The person (usually the switchboard operator) receiving the major incident 
declaration will need to verify the authenticity of the call. Most hospitals utilize 
a specific document as a reminder of what information to obtain (Tintanelli et al 
2005). Returning the call and re-confirming the details will add to information 
accuracy. This person then only activates key personnel with a short message. 
This should be brief and include a summary of the estimated number of 
patients, the type of incident, where it took place, at what time the incident 
occurred (Carley et al 2005) and the possible estimated time of arrival of the first 
casualties. 
 
4.2 Cascade activation 
One of the most efficient manners to activate a large number of staff in the 
shortest time is possibly by using a cascade (or call down) system (Carley et al 
2005).  
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The switchboard operator activates the first tier: Hospital Coordination Team 
(Figure 1); they in turn activate staff under them and on to the next level. If a 
staff member is not contactable it is important to contact them again after 
completion of the list.  
The crucial aspect of this system is deciding in the planning stage what structure 
the cascade will take and the allocation of specific roles. This cascade structure 
should tier according to clinical need with the most important staff activated 
first (Goldman et al 2007). 
 
Figure 1. Hospital Coordinating Team (Carley et al 2005). 
 
This structure forms part of the collapsible hierarchy of the HMIMMS major 
incident command structure. The Medical Coordinator is in overall command 
and the hospital coordinating team control the incident response (Carley et al 
2005). The initial activation will only be essential roles first.  
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 An example and local adaptation of the clinical hierarchy activation structure 
see Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a communication cascade structure (Adapted from Carley et al 2005). 
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The Senior Emergency Physician (first tier) will activate the clinical second tier. 
The Senior Nurse (first tier) will activate the nursing second tier. The Senior 
Manager (first tier) will activate the Senior Porter and the Reception Manager 
initially. 
It is crucial to have a cascade contact system set up and in place. This should 
provide accurate up to date contact details of each team member and be easily 
accessible to the on-call team leader (Carley et al 2005).  
The cascade is a time sensitive process and is structured in this way to contact 
and mobilize a large group of staff in the shortest time possible. Limitations 
would include outdated contact details, restricted access to the list after hours 
(Carley et al 2005) and whether staff members would require transport and/ or 
child care services. 
The best way to ensure optimal use of a call down system requires regular 
update of contact details (preferably monthly) and wide dissemination of the 
lists. The ideal place to keep a list may be in specific clinical departments with 
the person on duty then able to initiate the cascade. Non-clinical personnel will 
need access to these lists even after hours, as would clinical staff in certain 
instances (Carley et al 2005). This requires planning and local adaptations. Up to 
date copies can be kept at the security office and where the command post will 
be situated. Backup communication systems need to be in place to contact off 
duty staff. Commonly used modalities include pagers, cellular phones, e-mails, 
personal device applications (PDA’s) and even the media. 
Some hospitals assign one person to call all the staff on the call down list. This 
communications officer or designee will call a predetermined call down list 
using either a paging system or a telephonic system. The biggest limitation of 
this system is the time taken for one individual to call a large number of 
personnel while relaying a short message. A paging system might compensate 
for this by relaying the message and requiring a call back to the officer for 
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confirmation. It might leave the system activation vulnerable if the person or 
designee is not available. A further common limitation is the fact that personnel 
not regularly carry their pagers when off duty (Goldman et al 2007). 
 
4.3 Communication Cascade Testing 
Poor communication appears to be the most common failing in incident 
response and is a significant concern (Kaji et al 2003) (Alexander et al 2005) (Auf 
der Heide 1996) (Klein et al 1991). Testing the hospital communication systems 
is a vital part of evaluating how effective the incident plan activation is 
(Goldman et al 2007).  These tests will highlight flaws and deficiencies of the 
cascade structure. 
One of the very few published examples of a call down drill was published in a 
letter to the editor of the Disaster Management & Response journal (Goldman et 
al 2007). This test involved 72 staff in total (4 residency directors and 68 
residents). The residency director initiated the drill by calling the assistant 
directors and the four chief residents (first tier). The second tier divided into 8 
branches with 8 residents down each branch. Each resident called the name 
under theirs’ until the last one who phoned the residency directors again. The 
directors phoned the drill modulator to complete the activation of each branch. 
Each resident was instructed before the drill on the procedures and contact 
numbers and pager numbers were distributed to all. They were made aware to 
phone a resident back if one was not contactable. The results showed only half 
of the branches completed their drill within an hour and the longest took 3 
hours and 45 minutes. Reasons for the delays ranged from leaving a message 
and not returning the call, not carrying pagers to sleeping post call. The authors 
concluded the call down was effective but only repetition would improve 
response times. 
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4.4 Preparation Drills 
It is the repetition of these drills that will ensure personnel become familiar and 
comfortable with incident procedures (Marx et al 2002) (Tinanelli et al 2005).  
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
requires that United States compliant hospitals have two drills a year (Marx et al 
2002) (Tintanelli et al 2005). This would be difficult to achieve even in a 
developed world environment (Carley et al 2005) but the emphasis should 
remain on regular exercises. These training drills need not take the shape of a 
full-scale community wide and multiagency exercise for hospital personnel 
(Carley et al 2005). Regular drills can be developed using tabletop scenarios 
between different staff groups. Furthermore dynamic paper triage exercises can 
update the specific triage skills needed (Carley et al 2005). It may take the shape 
of a basic test of the communication capabilities by telephone. An example is a 
telephone audit that helped ascertain whether the West Midlands hospitals in 
the United Kingdom were prepared to respond to a chemical incident 
(Pooransingh et al 2003). Another example is a survey questionnaire followed 
by a telephone survey to study hospital preparations for a biological terrorist 
attack (Phillips 2004). These audits may be repeated annually and comparisons 
used to improve awareness. 
Tests involving communication are especially important in familiarizing 
personnel with equipment, procedures and back up or redundant systems 
(Shover 2007) (Marx et al 2002). Communication equipment like hospital 
telephone lines and power supply are particularly vulnerable during an incident 
(Milsten 2000). Observations from a hospital during the World Trade Centre 
attack noted that both internal and external lines were down and pagers and 
mobile phones only intermittently available (Roccaforte 2001). Similarly after the 
Omagh bombing in 1998 all the fixed line telephone lines were down and 
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cellular phone networks overloaded for a number of hours after the incident 
(Lavery et al 2005). This made communication with off duty staff almost 
impossible. This negated any communication cascade activation plan with no 
other backup. In this instance most staff was notified via the local media or 
word of mouth.  
Two-way radios are a common and useful back up modality on site and 
between Emergency Medical Services and the hospital (Lavery et al 2005) (Marx 
et al 2002). The use of two-way radios will require specific training and 
knowledge of the equipment, radio network and radio voice procedures 
(Hodgetts et al 2002). Further options include pagers, cellular phones, mobile 
devices, broadband Internet access, fax lines and the media (Marx et al 2002). 
The press may even be used in requesting specific specialist volunteers, instead 
of the general non-specific help offered by the public (Laverly et al 2005) 
(Martchenke et al 1995).  
In some countries the facility exists whereby the overloaded cellular network 
can suspend normal network services and enable emergency telephone access. 
This backup system may be utilized by the incident command structures when 
needed (Lavery et al 2005). In the United Kingdom the police may activate this 
“access overload control for cellular radio telephones” (ACCOLC). This 
activation was considered during the Omagh bombing but the pre-hospital 
incident management used radio communications and furthermore the 
receiving hospitals lacked these specific enabled cellar phones (Lavery et al 
2005). Emergency Medical Services used only a limited activation of one square 
kilometer around the Aldgate incident during the London bombing of 2005 
(McCue 2006). This limited use was again attributed to EMS personnel not 
carrying the specific phones. 
The last resort would be the use of staff or specific volunteers to act as runners. 
The Bellevue Hospital utilized medical students as runners during New York’s 
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World Trade Centre attacks (Roccaforte 2001). They were familiar with the staff, 
hospital premises and the equipment. 
If the components of the incident plan were exercised more regularly like testing 
the staff communication cascade activation (Gebbie et al 2007), exercising radio 
procedures, triage exercises and mini drills, it would ensure more effective real 
time exercises (Hodgetts et al 2002) (Tintanelli et al 2004). 
A real time exercise is possibly more important for pre-hospital personnel than 
for their’ in hospital counterparts. Hospital responders need to be aware of the 
pre-hospital response structure (Doyle 1990), but wouldn’t benefit as much from 
these exercise. This is from a practical point of view and operational 
interruptions would be too costly (Carley et al 2005). Legislation and a strong 
political will is needed to drive a sustainable preparation program (Marx et al 
2002)(Burstein 2008).   
 
4.5 Future Research 
Preparation priorities are firstly planning then adequate training (Baker 2007). 
The only way to improve disaster response is ensuring that the planning and 
training are evidence based (Auf der Heide 2006) (Burstein 2006). There have 
been repeated calls for standardization of evaluation tools specifically in order 
to evaluate major incident training.  
There have been attempts to standardize the criteria used in evaluating an 
emergency service’s medical response to a major incident (Green et al 2003). 
Utilizing these objective tools to identify limitations especially in a developing 
country setting may optimize future organizational responses. These tools have 
not found wide acceptance yet. 
The evidence to support specific major incident training that improve skills and 
knowledge is still lacking (Williams et al 2008) (Hideko 2007). One study from 
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Israel in 2008 showed a correlation between the best drill performances of 
hospitals with the best quality of standard operating procedures (Adini et al 
2008). This may suggest that if these generic plans are realistic they will help 
train clinicians to manage even the most challenging medical incidents (Burstein 
2008). 
Williams et al reported on their systematic review of the major incident 
preparation literature in 2008. They found that most research regarding major 
incident preparation and training are subjective reports and in the form of 
“lessons learned” (Auf der Heide 2006). The review evaluated the disaster 
training effectiveness and included both pre-hospital and hospital responders. 
They acknowledged that there were studies showing an improvement in the 
knowledge of pre-hospital responders after both computer and lecture training. 
These studies had various limitations though including selection bias by lacking 
control groups. The review could not accurately show effectiveness for in-
hospital personnel training. Most studies lacked the scientific robustness to 
enable firm conclusions to be drawn. An example was one study that did find a 
slight improvement in knowledge in Emergency Department personnel after a 
computer-based intervention (Chun et al 2004). The improvement was not 
statistically significant and the study was found to be underpowered. This 
means that almost all training exercises are done without the proper evidence to 
support their effectiveness. Furthermore that major incident planners making 
assumptions to develop an incident plan, do so without research to back these 
assumptions (Auf der Heide 2006). These possible false assumptions may cause 
responders to repeat mistakes from past incidents. The review called for disaster 
research based on more sound scientific grounds and that standardized 
evaluation tools are to be used to ascertain training effectiveness.  
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Chapter 3: Aim 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the staff activation process when a hospital’s 
Major Incident Plan is activated and specifically in terms of activation of the 
hospital’s communication cascade.  
To achieve this goal the following parameters were investigated: 
• Total number of management and staff activated 
• Average time to activation 
• Percentage able to be contacted 
• Percentage of staff available 
• Transport requirements 
• Child care requirements 
These parameters were utilized to compare the activation process at different 
test times and at different hospitals. The two hospitals were both from the 
private sector in the Cape Town metropolitan area. 
This may add to the limited research available on communication cascade drills 
and may also help in the development of a local generic activation protocol. 
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Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
The literature regarding communication cascade drills is still lacking. The 
literature review included relevant training course documentation: The 
Advanced Life Support Group (ALSG) MIMMS and HMIMMS courses; The 
Universities of Cape Town and Stellenbosch Disaster Medicine Course; The 
Emergency Medical Services Authority (EMSA) of California Hospital Incident 
Command System Guidebook. 
 The following databases were reviewed: 
• Science Direct 
• OVID Medline (R) 1950-Present 
• Sabinet Online 
• CSA Illumina Databases 
• MD Consult 
• Google Scholar 
• PubMed 
The following search terms were entered: disaster, disaster + preparation, 
disaster + test, major + incident + test, communication + test, communication + 
cascade + test and call +down+ drill + test. 
All relevant articles were reviewed by abstract and relevant article’s reference 
lists were reviewed for further relevant articles and extracted. 
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Chapter 5: Methods 
 
This was a descriptive study of the communication cascade activation of the 
hospitals in Cape Town that are designated as 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup 
receiving hospitals. Six of these hospitals identified are from the private sector 
and three are from the public sector. 
One hospital (Private Hospital 1) agreed to be included in the study the other 
eight hospitals did not respond and could not be included initially. It was 
possible to complete the test at the proposed different times and expand it to 
one further event at Private Hospital 1. The first drill was initiated at 10:10 on a 
Thursday; the second on a Tuesday night at 20:14 and the third was done 
retrospectively by each line manager after a major incident on a Friday at 12:45.  
Further recruitment of additional hospitals was attempted by including the 
communication cascade test submitted by each of the nine hospitals for the 
Western CAPE-abilities Long Distance Table-Top (LDTT) drill. This was a 
provincial led computer simulation test for the Cape Town metropolitan area. It 
consisted of twelve weekly drills between May and September 2009. This online 
disaster drill simulation was under the supervision of the New York Institute for 
All Hazard Preparedness (NYIAHP) of the State University of New York State 
(SUNY). One additional hospital (Private Hospital 2) could be included in the 
study and consent was obtained to use the data. Private Hospital 2 utilized a 
partial activation system. This limited activation was similar to Private Hospital 
1’s activation but limited the data comparisons. 
A further three hospitals submitted data but access to two of these submitted 
databases’ was restricted due to corrupt files. Neither the researcher nor 
researchers at SUNY was able to obtain access to this data. One further 
submission was a vague summary of an activation test and could not be 
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included due to the data not being comparable to the other two hospitals data 
sets. 
This study was conducted between April and October 2009 at two private 
hospitals in Cape Town: Private Hospital 1 (PH1) and Private Hospital 2 (PH2). 
The study was initiated with a detailed email orientation to all relevant hospital 
managers. This was followed up by meeting and further instructions given by 
utilizing an instruction sheet (Appendix 1). This included details on the 
initiation sequence, how to collect data, how the cascade should be structured 
and where the extra data sheets could be obtained (main reception desk or 
email). They were reminded to complete the call down and re-contact the staff 
not initially contactable. Each line manager was given a data collection sheet 
(Appendix 2) at least two weeks before the test but not told when the test would 
be activated. 
The proposed sequence was- A Major Incident call test was initiated with a call 
made to the hospital’s main reception or Emergency Unit at time 0 minutes. The 
reception staff activated the key staff members on their action card, giving them 
the following instructions: This is a Major Incident call test- please phone all the 
team members on your action card, for each call note the time the call is 
answered, ask an estimation how long it would take them to get to hospital and 
if transport or childcare is required. 
 Each department activated would call all the people on their respective action 
cards. Then each department was to document what time each individual’s call 
was answered. Staff members were asked to estimate how long it would take 
them to get to the hospital and if special services were required like child care or 
transport. 
It was noted how many staff members were unable to be mobilized e.g. out of 
town, ill, night duty, etc and what percentage of staff were not contactable. The 
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test was run at different times, to enable comparisons between day and night 
staff activations. These results were summarized on a different sheet (Appendix 
3) and compared. 
 
Data analysis 
Completed data collection sheets (Appendix 2) were reviewed and summarized 
(Appendix 3). 
Data variables reviewed: 
• Hospital 
• Number of line managers 
• Average time to activate line managers 
• Number of staff activated in total 
• Average time to activate staff 
• Percentage of staff contactable 
• Percentage of staff available 
• Percentage of staff requiring transport to hospital 
• Percentage of staff requiring child care 
• Percentage of all staff in hospital within the estimated 30 minutes 
• Estimated average travel time to hospital 
The 2-D clustered bar and the 2-D clustered column charts were chosen to 
represent the differences between the data sets visually. 
 
Ethical approval 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 32 
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from University of Cape Town 
Research Ethics Committee REC REF: 121/2009. Ethical approval was obtained 
from the relevant hospitals Academic Advisory Boards to conduct research at 
their hospitals. 
 
Outcome 
The outcome was to evaluate the communication cascade drill for each hospital. 
These drills were compared being activated at different times of the day and at 
different hospitals. 
The following end points were compared: 
• Average time to activate: managers and staff. 
• Estimated response time for off site staff. 
• Availability of staff: contactable, available, required childcare or 
transport. 
• Percentage of staff in hospital within a 30 minutes cutoff period. 
• Comparison between different activation times. 
• Comparison of the test times with an estimated actual response times. 
• Comparing different hospitals activation, response times and availability. 
These data sets can be repeated regularly as part of a planned major incident 
training drill. It may help in the development of a generic communication 
cascade test for the Cape Town Metropolitan area. 
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Chapter 6: Results 
 
Outcomes 
The first drill at Private Hospital 1 was run at 10:10 on Thursday 02/04/2009. 
A total of 75 staff was activated which included 9 line managers (Table 1). Over 
90% of staff was contactable and 85% were available to respond in case of a 
major incident. Average time to activate managers was 15.4 minutes and staff 
was activated in 8.3 minutes.  
Of the off site staff contacted, 32.1% required transport. Only 14.3% of them 
required childcare. The average estimated response time to hospital was 10.1 
minutes. More than 80% of staff was available within 30 minutes from being 
activated. 
Hospital:  
Test 1. Date 02/04/09 Thursday 10:10 
PH1 
Number of line managers: 9 
Number of staff in Total: 75 
Average time to activate line managers: 15.4 minutes 
Average time to activate staff: 8.3 minutes 
Percentage contactable: 90.9% 
Percentage available: 85% 
Percentage needing transport: 32.1% 
Percentage needing child care: 14.3% 
Percentage in hosp < 30 min: 80.9% 
Estimated response time to hospital: 10.1 minutes 
Table 1 
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The second drill at Private Hospital 1 (night time activation) was run at 20:14 on 
Tuesday 30/06/2009. 
A total of 101 staff was activated which included 9 line managers (Table 2). Over 
80% of staff was contactable and 74.3% were available to respond in case of 
activation. Average time to activate managers was 21.4 minutes and staff 34.6 
minutes.  
The percentage of staff requiring transport increased to 37.7% but only 13% 
requested childcare. The estimated response time to hospital was 17.7 minutes. 
After hours more than 80% of staff were estimated to be available within 30 
minutes from being activated. 
Hospital:  
Test 2. Date 30/06/09 Tuesday 20:14 
PH1 
Number of line managers: 9 
Number of staff in Total: 101 
Average time to activate line managers: 21.4 minutes 
Average time to activate staff: 34.6 minutes 
Percentage contactable: 81.3% 
Percentage available: 74.3% 
Percentage transport needed: 37.7% 
Percentage child care needed: 13% 
Percentage in hosp < 30 min: 80.5% 
Estimated response time to hospital: 17.7 minutes 
Table 2 
On 11/09/2009 a car collided with a bus on the R27 road just north of Cape 
Town. The female driver died on the scene and the bus rolled over injuring 67 of 
the 72 occupants. The Metro Emergency Medical Services contacted Private 
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Hospital 1 at 12:40. At 12:45 the hospital’s Major Incident Plan was activated. 
The communication cascade was activated and staff mobilized. From 13:30 a 
total of 26 patients were received: 7 Priority 2 (Yellow) and 19 Priority 3 (Green) 
patients. The following week all line managers on duty for the incident were 
requested to fill the communication cascade data collection sheets 
retrospectively. This formed part of the audit following the major incident.  
The third data set (Test 3) was included to compare the estimated response with 
the training drills. The total staff activated was 60 and included 7 line managers- 
Maternity and Paediatrics were not activated initially (Table 3). Over 96% of 
staff was contactable and 85.5% were available to respond. 
Average time to activate managers was 15.3 minutes and staff 11.3 minutes. No 
staff required transport or childcare. The estimated response time to hospital 
was 10.7 minutes. There was more than 87% of staff available within 30 minutes 
after being activated. 
Hospital:  
Test 3. Date 11/09/09 Friday 12:45 
PH1 
Number of line managers: 7 
Number of staff in Total: 60 
Average time to activate line managers: 15.3 minutes 
Average time to activate staff: 11.3 minutes 
Percentage contactable: 96.8% 
Percentage available: 85.5% 
Percentage needing transport: 0% 
Percentage needing child care: 0% 
Percentage in hosp < 30 min: 87.1% 
Estimated response time to hospital: 10.7 minutes 
Table 3 
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Private Hospital 2 submitted the fourth test on 18/10/2009 as part of the 
electronic simulation test- Western CAPE-abilities LDTT. This was a real time 
simulation of crush major incident at the Green Point Stadium in Cape Town, 
South Africa. The major incident for this was declared during office hours. This 
was a partial activation (Standby activation) with only the managers and 
selected staff directly affected by a major incident declaration contacted. 
The total staff activated was 24 and included 11 line managers (Table 4). All the 
managers and staff were contactable and available to respond. 
Average time to activate managers was 2.3 minutes and staff 2.6 minutes. None 
of the staff required transport or childcare. All the staff members contacted was 
already in hospital. This meant that all the staff was available within 30 minutes 
after being activated. 
Hospital:  
Test 4. Date 18/10/09 
PH2 
Number of line managers: 11 
Number of staff in Total: 24 
Average time to activate line managers: 2.3 minutes 
Average time to activate staff: 2.6 minutes 
Percentage contactable: 100% 
Percentage available: 100% 
Percentage needing transport: 0% 
Percentage needing child care: 0% 
Percentage in hosp < 30 min: 100% 
Estimated response time to hospital: Not applicable 
Table 4 
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Comparisons 
1. Staff activation times: day versus night 
Firstly the cascade activation was compared at Private Hospital 1 at different 
times of the day. Test 1 (PH1 Test AM) was activated in morning and Test 2 
(PH2 Test PM) at nighttime. 
Activation during normal office hours for the managers was 28% faster than at 
night (15.4 minutes compared with 21.4 minutes; n= 9 for both). Staff members 
were activated 76% slower during the nighttime activation, but 26 % more staff 
were activated (8.3 minutes versus 34.6 minutes; n= 66 daytime and n= 92 at 
night) (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Activation times of Managers and Staff: day versus night 
 
2. Staff availability: day versus night 
The time of the day resulted in almost 10% more staff being contactable during 
the day (90.9% versus 81.3%) and 10.7% less available at night (85% versus 
74.3%) (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Staff - availability and contact ability at different times 
 
3. Transport and Childcare requirements 
The number of off site staff’s transport requirements increased by 5.6% during 
the nighttime activation (32.1% versus 37.7%). Childcare needed was very 
similar for both. During the daytime activation 14.3% might need care and at 
night 13% indicated that they also might require childcare (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Transport and childcare requirements- off site staff 
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4. Estimated response time: day versus night 
Estimated off site staff response time to the hospital was 10.1 minutes during the 
day and 17.7 minutes at night. This was with almost 2.5 times more staff off site 
at night (n=28 for daytime and n=69 at night) (Figure 9). 
 
5. Arrival under 30 minutes: day versus night 
Around 80% of the total on and off site staff members were able to arrive at the 
hospital within 30 minutes during either the day or nighttime (80.9% and 80.5%) 
(Figure 8).  
 
6. Staff activation: two daytime activations 
Comparing the daytime (Test 1) activation to the major incident activation (Test 
3) showed very similar results. The managers were activated in 15.4 minutes 
and 15.3 minutes respectively. Staff members were activated in 8.3 minutes in 
Test 1 and 11.3 minutes in Test 3 (Figure 6).   
 
Figure 6. Activation time comparison of the daytime drill and the incident 
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7. Staff availability: two daytime activations 
Staff availability showed the same trends during the two daytime activations. 
This showed that 85% of staff was available for Test 1 and 85.5% for the major 
incident activation. There was 96.8% of staff contactable during the real 
activation and 90.9% during the daytime drill (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Staff availability daytime 
 
8. Arrival under 30 minutes 
A comparison of data using both tests and the incident showed that more than 
80% of the total staff number (both on and off site) estimated that they would be 
at the hospital within the 30 minutes cut off time (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Estimated arrival of all staff under the 30 minutes cutt off. 
 
9. Estimated Response Time 
The response time to the hospital was estimated to be almost 10 minutes during 
both the daytime activations but almost 8 minutes longer at night (17.7 minutes) 
(Figure 9). At nighttime there were significantly more staff off site (n=69) than 
either the day test (n=28) or major incident (n=7). 
 
Figure 9. Estimated response times for off site staff 
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10. Management Activation: two hospitals 
Comparing the two hospitals’ management activation showed that Private 
Hospital 2 activation time was 6 times faster than Private Hospital 1 (2.3 
minutes versus 15.4 minutes) (Figure 10). This even though 11 managers were 
activated at Private Hospital 2 and only 9 at Private Hospital 1. 
 
Figure 10. Management activation time at different hospitals. 
 
11. Staff Activation: two hospitals 
The staff activation times’ were also 3 times faster at Private Hospital 2 (2.6 
minutes versus 8.3 minutes) (Figure 11). There was significantly more staff 
members activated at Private Hospital 1 though at 69, compared to the 13 at 
Private Hospital 2. 
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Figure 11. Staff activation at different hospitals 
 
12. Staff Availability: two hospitals 
The limited activation of Private Hospital 2 showed that all staff members 
activated (24 in total) was contactable, available and on site in less than 30 
minutes. At the Private Hospital 1 a total of 75 personnel were activated, of 
which 90.9% were contactable, 85% available to respond and 80% on site within 
30 minutes after activation (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12. Comparison between staff availability at two hospitals.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
The development of a major incident plan should incorporate generic 
requirements with local practicalities. A crucial part of the plan entails a 
formalized communication cascade or call down procedure. Incorporating the 
data from regular incident exercises will enable the development of revised and 
validated plans (Brady 2003). 
 
7.1 Study Limitations  
An argument may be made that the instructions to the managers and data 
sheets would cause bias and neither was there a control to compare the data to. 
This was unavoidable as there was no formal structure in place before the study.  
The development of major incident plans for hospitals in South Africa may not 
have received adequate attention in the past. The reasons for this may range 
from inadequate funding, lack of resources, political will, motivation and to 
limited research. The lack of funding is not unique to South Africa but even in 
developed countries like the United States the private sector more frequently 
developed an incident plan compared to the non-private hospitals (Phillips 
2004). A strong political will is essential to drive the formal legislative and 
organizational requirements to establish major incident preparation plans (Marx 
et al 2002)(Burstein 2008).  
Most likely very few of the hospitals in the Cape Town metropolitan area had a 
formal communication cascade structure in place previously. The activation of a 
major incident without this is less structured and will take on an ad hoc 
approach. Development of the structured approach was recently stimulated by 
the introduction of the MIMMS and HMIMMS systems as the preferred 
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response structure for South Africa in preparation for the 2010 FIFA Soccer 
World Cup.  
A limitation of this study is that very few hospitals were motivated enough to 
develop a communication cascade even as part of the international long distance 
tabletop exercise. The more hospitals included, even only from the private 
institutions, would have enabled better comparisons. 
A further limitation comparing the data is the different format all the hospitals 
utilized to collect the data, the style also varied widely and lacked consistency. 
One hospital submitted a very poorly formulated data set to represent the 
activation of one of the biggest state hospitals in the province. This submission 
could not be utilized due to the limited data it contained.  
The Private Hospital 2 used a limited activation system (similar to a Standby 
activation) even though they had the study template at their disposal. This only 
included personnel from management, a few hospital services and emergency 
medicine practitioners.  
The Private Hospital 1 utilized the study format and activated all personnel: all 
the managers and line managers, hospital services, wards, theatre, Intensive 
Care Unit, emergency unit, specialists and all nursing staff. Each hospital will 
have different requirements and expectations for incident exercises. This will 
lead to different drill tests and data sets. A standard generic template would 
help to standardize the call down with specific local adaptations. 
A further limitation is utilizing data captured retrospectively after a major 
incident. It is neither ethical nor practical to complete the data sheets during a 
major incident. The data can only be considered a good estimation, but the 
information was useful from an audit point of view. 
 
7.2 Study Strengths 
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The benefit of the cascade activation at a different time of day while using the 
same activation system resulted in useful data comparisons. Similarly useful 
was utilizing a daytime activation test as a control and comparing it to real time 
major incident cascade activation. 
The two hospitals included are both from the private sector (similar staffing and 
management structures) and the data comparable in most regards.  
     
7.3 Outcome discussion 
Private Hospital 1 is a community or Level 2 Hospital (according to the 
Department of National Health). On call services include a General Surgeon, 
Neurosurgeon, Cardio-Thoracic Surgeon, Physician, Paediatrician, Radiologist, 
Emergency Medicine Physician among others.  
Private Hospital 2 is a referral hospital but also a Level 2 Hospital (according to 
the Department of National Health), with the similar on call services. It does 
additionally have a cardiac catheter laboratory. These two hospitals have similar 
management structures, patient profiles and staffing levels. 
These hospitals are in the private sector but have specific limitations in major 
incident response which include: a high turnover of medical and nursing staff, 
large percentage of part-time (locum) employees and on call specialist covering 
more than one hospital per call day. The high turnover of staff and utilization of 
agency staff may negate any training if not part of a standard orientation 
program or not repeated regularly. The true specialist cover will be limited in a 
major incidence response affecting more than one private hospital. 
The major incident plan has to take into consideration these limitations. This 
may include regular training days and have agreements in place for the off duty 
specialist to be available if needed. 
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The first test at Private Hospital 1 showed that during the day, out of the 75 
personnel activated it took almost twice as long to activate managers than staff 
(15.4 minutes versus 8.3 minutes). This was in spite of the fact that 69 staff 
members were activated compared to the 9 managers during the daytime drill. 
A large proportion of the staff (n=47) was on site and in the department so that 
their activation time would be quicker once initiated. Most of the staff were 
contactable (90.9%), available (85%) and at the hospital within the required 30 
minutes if activated (80.9%). 
The second test at Private Hospital 1 revealed that at night it took almost twice 
as long to activate the staff than the managers (34.6 minutes versus 21.4 
minutes). Furthermore less staff was contactable (81.3%) and available (74.3%) at 
night. This limitation not withstanding, most (80.5%) estimated they would be 
on site within the 30 minutes cutoff. 
 The major incident data from Private Hospital 1 showed more similar activation 
times for managers (15.3 minutes) and staff (11.3 minutes). The majority of the 
personnel was contactable (96.8%), available (85.5%) and could be on the 
premises within the required 30 minutes (87.1%). 
The cascade test submitted by Private Hospital 2 showed a very rapid response 
time for both managers (2.3 minutes) and staff (2.6 minutes). It was a limited 
cascade activation and where all personnel were contactable, available and on 
site within the 30 minutes post activation.  
 
7.4 Data comparisons 
7.4.1 Activation Time: day versus night 
Cascade activation at Private Hospital 1 during the day shift was compared to 
the activation of a night shift. The day shift managers were activated 28% faster 
than their night colleagues (15.4 minutes compared with 21.4 minutes). Most 
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managers would be on site during the day even though 9 managers were 
contacted in each test.  
Staff members were activated 76% faster during the day than at night (8.3 
minutes versus 34.6 minutes). This is a significant delay but most (75%) of the 
staff contacted was off site after hours. It may also be that the night staff was 
more unfamiliar with the activation process than their daytime counterparts. 
Delayed access to the contact lists may also have added to the long activation 
time. One of the managers noted that she could not access the list while at home. 
This is an important point to note and the night staff may need extra training to 
become more familiar with the system. 
 
7.4.2 Staff availability: day versus night 
The availability comparison between the time differences showed that almost 
10% more staff was available and contactable during the day (85% versus 74.3% 
were available and 90.9% versus 81.3% were contactable). This may indicate a 
reluctance of staff to respond after hours. There may be quite valid security 
concerns, transport requirements also increased at night and maybe a lack of 
motivation. Although this compares well with the previous published study 
that achieved only a 50% contactable test time after 1 hour (Goldman et al 2007). 
The ability and usefulness by comparing these two tests are lessened by the 
different methods used. 
 
7.4.3 Transport and childcare requirements 
The transport requirements expressed by activated off site staff increased from 
32.1% during the day to 37.7% at night. The childcare requirements seemed to 
affect only a small percentage of the staff (14.3% during the day and 13% at 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 50 
night). These requirements may have contributed to the drop in available staff 
members at night (from 85% down to 74.3%).  
 
7.4.4 Activation time: daytime only 
Utilizing (with the limitations accepted) the first daytime activation as a control 
and comparing it with the major incident activation data showed a few 
similarities. The activation of the managers took 15.4 minutes in the test and 15.3 
minutes during the major incident. The staff on the other hand took almost one 
and a half times longer to be activated during the real activation even though 
20% less staff were activated (8.3 minutes compared with 11.3 minutes).  
 
7.4.4 Staff availability: daytime only 
Similarities were also shown with staff availability; during the test it was 85% 
and 85.5% for the incident. Almost all the personnel were contactable for the 
incident activation (96.8%) and slightly less so for the test (90.9%). The 
similarities of the real daytime activation with the test in some way might 
validate the data gathered from the first drill. 
 
7.4.5 Arrival under 30 minutes 
The incident plan may very likely require that most of the activated staff be on 
the hospital premises within 30 minutes from the time of activation. Both the on 
site and off site personnel from the tests and incident estimated that more than 
80% of them would be on the hospital premises in this time.  
 
7.4.6 Estimated response time 
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The daytime activations showed the estimated response time to hospital to be 
approximately 10 minutes. This may indicate that most of the staff resides in 
close proximity to the hospital. At night the response time was 7.6 minutes 
longer at 17.7 minutes. An extrapolation taking into account the estimated 
response time of the off site staff together with the average time to activate off 
site staff at night, may mean most staff arriving on average 52.3 minutes after 
activation (34.6 + 17.7 = 52.3 minutes). This is a significant delay and especially 
with the lower after hours staffing levels (off site n=69 at night) compared to the 
daytime (off site n=28). The activation time at night needs to be sped up 
significantly through training and/ or extra staffing contingencies incorporated 
into the plan to cover possible night activation. This highlights some of the 
difficulties and limitations that nighttime incident plan activation may need to 
incorporate (Carley et al 2005). 
 
7.4.7 Activation time: two hospitals 
The next comparison was done between the two private hospitals’ daytime 
activations. The management activation at Private Hospital 2 showed a 
significant faster activation time at six times faster (2.3 minutes compared to 15.4 
minutes). This was with 11 managers activated at Private Hospital 2 and 9 at 
Private Hospital 1. This may indicate that the managers should review their 
activation protocol at Private Hospital 1 to identify this significant activation 
delay. One might have to consider bias in terms of personnel being primed or 
expecting the activation call from Private Hospital 2. The staff was also more 
rapidly activated at Private Hospital 2 at three times faster than their 
counterparts (2.6 and 8.3 minutes respectively). This may be attributed to the 
limited activation of PH2 staff of 13 compared to the 66 activated at PH1.  
 
7.4.8 Availability: two hospitals 
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The limited activation also likely explains the discrepancies of the staff 
availability between the two hospitals. All the personnel at Private Hospital 2 
were contactable, available and had response times under 30 minutes. The 75 
PH1 personnel showed that 90.9% were contactable, 85% were available and 
80.9% would be able to make the required thirty minutes on site time. 
 
7.5 Communication Cascade Tests 
The structured approach to a major incident plan requires a structured 
communication cascade system. It is through careful planning, consideration of 
system limitations and adhering to key elements that a robust structure is 
developed. 
 
7.5.1 Preparation 
The preparation will include educating all staff and familiarizing them with the 
structure. Regular training drills should follow and be incorporated in the 
incident plan preparation and development. The annual review of the plan 
should include the results of the cascade audit. The phone tree should be widely 
distributed together with the audit sheets to enable the drill activation at any 
time. This may improve the bias encountered with staff anticipating the test. 
 
7.5.2 Common problems encountered with a cascade system 
• The most common limitation is outdated or inaccurate contact 
information. 
• Restricted access to the contact lists at night. 
• Personnel are less contactable and less available when activated after 
hours. 
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• Response times may be affected by the time of day (traffic peak hours or 
night time). 
 
7.5.3 Key elements to develop a cascade structure 
• Careful consideration of the cascade structure: defining who may activate 
the cascade, type of activation (Standby or Declared) and most critical 
staff activated first by defining each tier’s structure (first tier hospital 
coordination team, second tier managers, third tier line managers, etc). 
• Contact list or phone tree need to be updated regularly (preferably 
monthly or quarterly). This should specifically include a back up list of 
all on and off duty specialist available. 
• Up to date contact lists need wide distribution and be freely available at 
any time (copies may be kept in the departments, security office and at 
the hospital coordinating team’s meeting point). 
• Back up communication systems development – may be pagers, cellular 
phones or email. 
• Regular drills at different times of the day. 
• The communication cascade as part of the major incident plan annual 
audit. 
• Two specifically structured cascade systems one for a standby (partial) 
activation and for a declared (full) activation. 
 
7.5.4 Declaration Structures 
7.5.4.1 Standby (Partial) Activation 
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• Definition – Situation develops that threatens to possibly compromise the 
hospital’s service delivery ability. This includes Emergency Unit 
overcrowding, Very Important Person patient, partial failure of hospital 
services or equipment and Emergency Medical Services notifies the 
hospital of possible major incident in the area. 
• Activated by the Medical Coordinator (or stand in) in consultation with 
Hospital Coordinating Team.  
• Only key personnel notified after verification that were identified 
previously in standby activation cascade plan. 
• Example of cascade activation    - Call taker phones the Medical 
                                                           Coordinator. 
                                                                      - Medical Coordinator phones the first 
    tier, consisting of the Hospital  
    Coordinating Team. 
• These senior staff members will review the current staffing and bed 
levels. 
• Staff will review their action cards. 
 
7.5.4.2 Declared (Full) Activation 
• Definition – Major Incident developed that will affect the hospital’s 
ability to deliver a service so that extra resources need to be mobilized to 
respond. 
• Activated by Emergency Medical Services or Medical Coordinator in 
consultation with the Hospital Coordinating Team. 
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• Call taker to verify the call and ascertain location of the incident, type of 
incident, estimated number of patients, time of incident and expected 
time of arrival. 
• Cascade activation  - Call taker phones the Medical Coordinator 
- Medical Coordinator phones the first tier (Hospital 
  Coordinating Team). 
- First Tier activate the second tier, etc 
• Full activation – Staff to review action cards and preparation of receiving 
areas. 
• Real time staffing counts and bed status. 
• Ensure that the major incident plan is activated in each department. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This study described the initial development of a communication cascade 
system at two private hospitals in the Cape Town metropolitan area. 
Comparisons between activation drills at different times of the day highlighted 
the operational deficiencies experienced. The most notable problems were 
encountered during the after hours activation.  
Most (more than 80%) off the staff activated were in hospital within an 
estimated 30 minutes from activation during the day or night. The most 
significant delay was experienced during night activation with the estimated 
response time increased by more than 57%, staff activation time was 76% slower 
and on average 10 % less staff were contactable and available at night. Transport 
requirements for off site staff increased from 32.1% during the day to 37.7% with 
a nighttime activation. It is only through regular drills that organizational 
limitations can be identified and incorporated into revised plans. These drills 
ensure a seamless integration from planning and training to responding to a 
major incident. 
This study was limited due to the inherent lack of structured communication 
cascade systems in hospitals in both private and state hospitals in Cape Town. 
The lack of motivation and political will has limited the ability to expand on the 
initial stimulation created by the preparation for the FIFA 2010 Soccer World 
Cup. 
It is the responsibility of the National Department of Health, in accordance to 
Section 25 of the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002, to ensure adequate health 
structures relating to Disaster Risk Management with “an integrated monitoring 
and evaluation system”.  
A lasting legacy of major incident planning preparation can only be achieved by 
enforcing the legislative Disaster Risk Management requirements. 
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Chapter 9: Recommendations 
 
The following recommendations can be made in the development of a generic 
communication cascade system for the Cape Town Metropolitan area: 
• As proposed by HMIMMS, specific drills rather than full-scale multi-
agency exercises will be more beneficial and cost effective for in-hospital 
staff compared to pre-hospital staff (Carley et al 2005). It is this 
researchers opinion that this is especially applicable in a developing 
world setting. 
• Key elements identified: attention to the cascade structure detail (partial 
and full activation), updated contact lists made freely available, backup 
communication systems development and regular standardized training 
drills. 
• Local adaptations to a generic communication cascade system may 
ensure acceptance and familiarity with activation procedures. 
• A strong political will is required to achieve the Disaster Management 
Act requirements. 
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Appendix 1 
1. 
Instructions: Communication Cascade Test 
 Management meeting 
Preparation: 
- Process walk through 
- Phone tree with numbers 
- Data sheets 
i) Phone switchboard to activate test- Time= 0 min 
2. Algorithm 
ii) Switchboard activates Hospital Co-ordinating Team (HCT) 
iii) Each member of HCT phones every person on their phone tree- 
Note time contacted 
                                    - Available Y/N 
                                    - Transport needed Y/N 
                                    - Childcare Y/N 
                                    - Estimated time to hosp 
                              -If unable to contact reattempt at end of list Un
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Medical 
Co-ordinator 
Senior Emergency 
Physician 
Senior 
Nurse 
Senior 
Manager 
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Appendix 2 
 
Data sheet: 
DEPARTMENT: 
Line Manager: 
____________________________ 
Time activated: 
______________________________ 
 
_____________________________ 
Total number of staff in Department: 
                                                 On duty: _____________ 
_____________ 
                                                 Off duty: _____________ 
Time taken to activate staff Min 
Percentage of staff contactable   
Percentage of staff available to work  
Percentage of staff requiring transport  
Percentage of staff requiring Childcare  
Percentage of activated staff in Hospital 
within 30 minutes 
 
Average time to hospital Min 
 
Comments: 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________       
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Initial 
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Available 
Y/N    
Transport 
Y/N 
Child 
Care Y/N 
Est. Time 
To Hosp 
1)        
2)        
3)        
4)        
5)        
6)        
7)        
8)        
9)        
10)        
11)        
12)        
13)        
14)        
15)        
16)        
17)        
18)        
19)        
20)        
21)        
22)        
23)        
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Appendix 3 
Hospital: 
Summary Sheet 
Number of line managers: 
Average time to activate line managers: 
Number of staff in Total: 
Average time to activate staff: 
Percentage contactable: 
Percentage available: 
Percentage transport needed: 
Percentage childcare needed: 
Percentage in hosp < 30 min: 
Average time to hospital: 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
Comments: 
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